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COMMENTARY
Social and Economic Goals and Their Impact on
the Defense Acquisition Process
Thomas E. Harvey*
I. Introduction
Any discussion of the Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition process
brings to mind the instances in which DOD purchases have been suggested to
have been careless, inept or even profligate. Questions have been raised as to
the ability of the DOD procurement system to function as efficiently and effec-
tively as a business in the private sector motivated and judged by profit criteria.
People involved in government procurement operate under strictures not
encountered in private enterprise. Their expenditures do more than merely ac-
quire goods and services at the lowest possible cost. A wide variety of social
policies is implemented through the government's acquisition process.
Although the Commission on Government Procurement cataloged some thirty-
eight different social and economic programs furthered through the procure-
ment process, I the list is continually changing in response to perceived societal
needs and the political pressures of the moment. Current estimates are that
there are some thirty-five to forty specific programs in existence and exerting
their influence on the acquisition process. These programs are not cataloged in
any single place. Some are statutory. Others derive from regulations or from
executive directive. Only a familiarity with the government acquisition process
makes them apparent.
This commentary considers some of these programs and their impact on
the defense acquisition budget and addresses problems created in attempting to
utilize the procurement process to further nonprocurement social and
economic goals.
2
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In 1977, after five years with the New York law firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy, Mr.
Harvey was selected by President Carter to be a White House Fellow. The views expressed in this commen-
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ministration.
1 1 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 114 (1972).
2 This commentary does not address the impact of various labor-related statutes requiring payment of
"the prevailing wage" in various government contracts. These are principally the Davis-Bacon Act, 40
U.S.C. § 276a-1-5 (1976), governing construction contracts; the Wash-Healy Act, 41 U.S.C. §5 35-45
(1976), governing supply contracts; the Service Contract Act of 1965, 41 U.S.C. §§ 351-357 (1976), govern-
ing service contracts; and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201-219 (1976), establishing
minimum wage and maximum hour standards. Neither does it address the various statutes and regulations
relating to Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) and affirmative action programs oriented toward assur-
ing this. Responsibility for enforcement of EEO provisions was assigned to the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs, Department of Labor, on October 5, 1978, by Exec. Order No. 12,086, 43 Fed.
Reg. 46,501 (1978). Environmental legislation such as the Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858a
(1976), and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976), implemented
by Exec. Order No. 11,738, 38 Fed. Reg. 25,161 (1973), which articulates the government's policy "to im-
prove and enhance environmental quality," is also excluded from the discussion. Each of these excluded
categories, indeed each of the individual policies discussed here, is on such scope as to warrant a full text
devoted exclusively to it.
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II. National Policies Implemented Through the Procurement Process
A. Maintenance of a Production Base
One important factor to be considered in the acquisition of any military
material is the need to maintain a domestic production base3 capable of
manufacturing such material in wartime. This often requires the issuance of
contracts to acquire limited quantities, often sacrificing economies of scale,
merely to enable manufacturers to develop and maintain the skilled work force
and capital plant which would be required in a wartime mobilization. The con-
flict between the desire to acquire goods and services at the lowest possible
price and the need to maintain a domestic production base for those goods is
particularly vivid in the areas of munitions and armaments manufacture, com-
modities having minimal nonmilitary markets. In any future war, no time
would be available to develop a competent work force and construct the capital
facilities necessary to manufacture munitions in the volume required to equip
troops in combat.
For certain items, there simply is no commercial production facility which
could possibly meet the wartime needs of the military. To supply such
materials, it has been necessary for the government to acquire and equip such a
facility and then operate the plant itself or contract with private industry for its
operation. To assure effective and economical employment of such facilities,
the Army Arsenal Act4 provides that supplies which can be manufactured in
such facilities shall be manufactured there.
Having determined to supply its needs through its own facilities, to pre-
vent the erosion of a work force and the economic dislocation which would be
created if employment in a region were to be dependent on a single facility
responding to the needs of an unstable market, the government has, in some
situations, proceeded one step further. This has been done in the area of jewel
bearing manufacture. Jewel bearings are integral to various navigational in-
struments, fire control and communications equipment. The Defense Acquisi-
tion Regulation requires that: "Defense requirements for jewel bearings must,
to the maximum extent practicable, be procured from the Government-owned
3 Industrial Preparedness Production Planning, Defense Acquisition Regulation S 1-2200 (1976),
established procurement policy for the Department of Defense "in planning with industry for the establish-
ment and retention of industrial base capability essential to national defense for production during periods
of national emergencies." (Department of Defense Directive 5000.35, dated March, 1978, changed the
name of the Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) to the Defense Acquisition Regulation
(DAR). Although this name change was effective immediately, the regulation itself has not been republished
in anticipation of the publication of a uniform Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) which will mesh the
current DAR governing Department of Defense acquisitions with the Federal Procurement Regulation
(FPR) governing procurement by the civilian federal agencies.)
4 10 U.S.C. 5 4532 (a) (1976). The Army Arsenal Act provides that"ithe Secretary... shall have sup-
plies needed for the... Army made in factories or arsenals owned by the United States, so far as [they] can
make those supplies on an economical basis." Id. The Air Force Arsenal Act of 1956, 10 U.S.C. S 9532
(1976), provides that the Secretary may have supplies needed for the Air Force made at factories, arsenals or
depots of the United States. Both provisions conflict directly with the policy of Office of Management of the
Budget Circular No. A-76, 44 Fed. Reg. 20,556 (April 5, 1979), "Policies for Acquiring Commercial or In-
dustrial Products and Services Needed by the Government," which provides at paragraph 4.a: "The
government's business is not to be in business ......
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William Langer Jewel Bearing Plant, Rolla, North Dakota, which is operated
through a contract by the General Services Administration."
5
B. The Buy American Act and the Balance of Payments Program
1. The Buy American Act
To assist in the maintenance of a domestic production base, since 1933 the
government has followed a policy that manufactured materials acquired for
public use shall be substantially constituted from domestically mined or
manufactured articles or supplies. Pursuant to the Buy American Act, 6 con-
tracts are to be awarded for domestic goods even though the bid price is as
much as six percent in excess of the lowest foreign bid. As a matter of ad-
ministrative practice, the DOD adds an additional six percent to the differen-
tial in cases where the low domestic bid is from a small business concern or a
business concern in a labor surplus area. Provisions of the Buy American Act
may be waived where it is determined that the purchase is inconsistent with the
public interest or the cost is unreasonable after application of the six percent
differential.
In addition, since 1962, it has been DOD practice in evaluating bids offer-
ing foreign source items against bids- offering domestic source items to apply an
alternative fifty percent differential to the foreign prices (without duty).7 This
practice was initiated as one of a number of measures instituted during the
1960's and early 1970's to stem the "gold flow," recognized as a serious
problem at that time.
2. The Balance of Payments Program
Although Buy American provisions do not generally apply to goods and
services required for use outside the United States, to counteract the un-
favorable trade balances existing between the U.S. and those foreign countries
in which the U.S. has sizable defense installations, DOD has established a
balance of payments program 8 which requires that, where possible, products
manufactured in the U.S. will be acquired for use abroad and includes applica-
tion of the fifty percent differential where items being procured are for use out-
side the U.S. The purpose of the program is the reduction of overseas dollar ex-
penditures at an acceptable increase in budgetary costs.
Additional buy-national restrictions are regularly incorporated in the an-
nual Defense Appropriation Act which restricts the availability of funds for the
procurement of foreign source articles of food, clothing, cotton, wool, silk and
5 DAR § 1-2207.2(b) (1976).
6 41 U.S.C. 5§ 10a-10d (1976), implemented by Exec. Order No. 10,582, 19 Fed. Reg. 8723 (1954),
dated December 21, 1954, which defines domestic goods as being unreasonable in price if the price of such
goods exceeds the price of foreign goods (including duty) by more than 6%, as amended by Exec. Order No.
11,051, 27 Fed. Reg. 9683 (1962), dated September 27, 1962, and implemented by DAR 9 VI, Part I. See
also [1972] 2 GOV'T GONT. REP. (CCH) 7200.
7 DAR § 6-104.4(b) (1976).
8 DAR 5 6-800 (1976). See also [19721 2 Gov'T CONT. REP. (CCH) 7385.
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various specialty metals. 9 Congress has also restricted funds for such things as
the acquisition of foreign buses"' and for resear ch and development contracting
with foreign sources.1
C. NA TO Rationalization, Standardization and Interoperability
In spite of these Buy American considerations, the government is ag-
gressively pursuing a policy to insure that weapons systems within the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are interoperable, that is to say, that all
NATO nations use basically the same weapons requiring the same types of
maintenance and ammunition. Thg development of competing weapons
systems by various NATO allies is not only costly, but also creates awesome
logistical problems in any combat situation. Ammunition supplies to provide
the requirements of different Units each utilizing a different weapon system
would be not only expensive, but virtually impossible to maintain in quantities
sufficient to meet the needs of units in combat.
The Culver-Nunn Amendment to the Defense Appropriation Act of
197512 formally committed the United States to standardization within NATO
by requiring annual progress reports for any NATO nonstandard weapon pro-
cured by the United States. This gave respectability to the idea that there could
be some military procurement outside the United States in the interest of stan-
dardization.
The Defense Appropriation Authorization Act for fiscal year 1977 con-
tains an expanded version of the Culver-Nunn Amendment which provides,
among other things, that it is U.S. policy to ensure that all NATO equipment
is, if not standardized, at least interoperable. To achieve this end, the
Secretary of Defense may waive Buy American laws when domestic procure-
ment is determined to be inconsistent with the public interest. New systems in-
tended for NATO use are to conform to a common NATO requirement.
Licensing and coproduction agreements between allies are encouraged, and
the "two-way street" approach to standardization is endorsed. 13
Since that time various memoranda of understanding have been executed
between the U.S. and certain of its NATO allies, providing for the mutual
waiver of buy-national restrictions and access of each to the defense market of
the other. Certain of these memoranda also provide for compensating offset
agreements. Others provide for coproduction of separable parts of complex
weapons systems.
1 4
The road toward rationalization, standardization and interoperability of
weapons systems within NATO has not been smooth. In addition to considera-
tions of increased military might, economic and political realities have had an
9 DAR 5 6-300 (1976). See also [1972] 2 GOV'T CONT. REP. (CCH) 7270.
10 Act of Sept. 20, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-500, 5 404, 82 Stat. 849 (1969).
11 Department of Defense Appropriation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 92-570, 5 744, 86 Stat. 1184 (1973).
12 Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-106, 5 814, 89
Stat. 531 (1977).
13 Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 94-361, 155 802-803,
90 Stat. 923 (1976).
14 A draft of S V of DAR is currently in the final stages of preparation. This section will address im-
plementation of the various Memoranda of Understanding and reprint the full text of each.
[Vol. 55:254]
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impact. National industries gaining business as a result of increased access to
an expanded defense market are generally supportive, those losing business as
a result of another's more ready access to their market are not. They manifest
this displeasure by mobilizing the political forces at their disposal against any
such programs.
In early 1978, a special Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Com-
mittee was appointed to consider NATO standardization, interoperability and
readiness. The subcommittee's report15 was generally critical of DOD efforts to
achieve NATO standardization and interoperability, and concluded that the
terms themselves are ambiguous and have produced confusing and conflicting
guidance for translating policy into action. Among the report's recommenda-
tions was that the Culver-Nunn Amendment be examined in detail to deter-
mine whether basic changes should be made to it and the philosophy it em-
bodies.
A real world consideration to be borne in mind as progress, or lack of it,
occurs in this area is the more vocal reaction of our NATO allies to what they
perceive as an historical imbalance in arms sales within the alliance which has
greatly favored the U.S. As this country attempts to encourage its NATO allies
to invest more heavily in the defense of the alliance, they are more and more
often demanding that they be given their fair share of the economic fallout of a
decision to do so. This is further complicated by the fact that our NATO allies
have defense industries of widely disparate capabilities ranging from the
sophisticated technology and marketing of the Germans, British and French to
the much less sophisticated Portuguese, Greeks and Turks.16
D. Small Business
There is a general policy within the government to assist small businesses
to obtain and successfully complete procurement contracts. This policy is in-
tended to insure the continued existence of small business concerns, a healthy
competitive environment and a broad base of capable suppliers should a na-
tional emergency require mobilization of this production base.
17
The Small Business Administration (SBA) was created in 195318 for the
purpose of assisting in the creation of a national small business base and insur-
ing that small businesses receive preferential treatment when government pro-
curement contracts are awarded. Every President and each Congress since its
inception have consistently reinforced their support for the government's small
business program.
In support of small business, the SBA can provide financial assistance to
bidders in certain situations, primarily to enable them to complete perfor-
mance of government contracts. It also guarantees commercial loans to small
businesses and makes loans directly to small businesses in disaster or emergen-
cy situations. Should a contracting officer question the competency of a small
15 H.R. Rep. No. 1075(JI), 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978).
16 Gessert, Industrial Considerations in Transatlantic Weapons Cooperation, Part 1: European Industry and
Political Perspectives, 12 INT'L DEF. REv. 921 (1979).
17 DAR § 1-700 (1976). See also [19721 1 Gov'T CONT. REP. (OCH) 1020.
18 Small Business Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 85-536, § 4(a), 72 Stat. 384 (1959).
[December 19791
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business to perform on a government contract, the SBA has the authority to
determine conclusively that the small business possesses all elements of respon-
sibility including capability, competency, capacity, credit, integrity,
perseverance and tenacity. While in many instances certification of competen-
cy has resulted in economies because of issuance of a contract to a small
business which was the lowest bidder, the Commission on Government Pro-
curement questioned whether there had been net savings to the government
because of increased administrative costs required to assist the contractor and,
where he has failed to perform, re-let the contract.19
Among the problems faced in the small business program is defining what
is a small business. Such a definition differs from industry to industry and from
year to year. Although it is recognized that the definition should change to ac-
commodate the intent of congressional programs, changing definitions have
confused and handicapped some small firms in obtaining government con-
tracts. With changing definitions, the availability of SBA assistance programs
has not alWays been clear.
Also troubling is the problem of determining what constitutes a fair pro-
portion of the procurement budget to be channeled to small business. The
Small Business Act expresses the government policy to insure that small
business receives a fair proportion of the total contracts placed by the govern-
ment.
20
In 1961 the government established a small business subcontracting pro-
gram to ensure that small business firms would receive an adequate opportuni-
ty to subcontract for divisible portions of larger prime contracts.2 1 Yet in times
of a constricting federal budget, large contractors become concerned about
maintaining their work force and operating their facilities to capacity. As a
result, they tend to make rather than buy what would otherwise have been ac-
quired from subcontractors, and when they do buy, first consideration often
goes to firms which can offer subcontracts in return.
E. Socially and Economically Disadvantaged Small Business Concerns
Almost all minority-owned businesses are small; however, most small
businesses are not minority owned. Because minority businesses have a series
of problems which go beyond those of mere size, in 1978 Congress passed
significant amendments to the Small Business Act 22 designed to redress "the
historic past discrimination of minorities in their efforts to participate in the
free enterprise system."
23
The amendments direct the creation within each agency of an Office of
Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization responsive directly to the head
of the agency or his deputy and responsible for implementing prime and sub-
contracting programs under the Small Business Act. Included within these pro-
19 1 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 130 (1972).
20 15 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1976).
21 Id. § 637(d).
22 H.R. 11,318 enacted as Act of Oct. 24, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-507, 92 Stat. 1757.
23 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1714, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3879, 3883 (accompanying H.R. 11,318).
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grams is the requirement that bidders on all large federal contracts submit,
before award of contract, a subcontracting plan setting forth percentage goals
for the utilization as subcontractors of small business concerns and small
business concerns owned or controlled by socially and economically disadvan-
taged individuals. Failure to comply in good faith with the terms of the plan
constitutes a material breach of the contract. 24 The amendments also provide
for incentives to prime contractors to encourage subcontracting opportunities
to small and disadvantaged firms and a provision that each agency shall
establish its own goals for the participation of small and disadvantaged
businesses in its procurements.
The original Small Business Act contained a provision at section 8(a)
which authorized the SBA to contract with other government agencies and to
subcontract actual performance to "small business concerns and others."
While the statute contained no mention of minority-owned firms, SBA regula-
tions stated the policy that section 8(a) was to be utilized "to assist small
business concerns owned and controlled by socially or economically disadvan-
taged persons to achieve a competitive position in the market place.'"25
Public Law Number 95-507 gives clear-cut legitimacy to the use of the sec-
tion 8(a) program for the purpose of assisting minority small business in pro-
viding that the SBA may subcontract to socially and economically disadvan-
taged small business concerns for performance as subcontractors of the various
contracts entered into by the SBA pursuant to section 8(a).
26
F. Labor Surplus Areas
Defense Manpower Policy Number 4A2 7 states that it is the policy of the
government to encourage the placing of contracts and facilities in labor surplus
areas and to assist such areas in making the best use of their available
resources. The Department of Labor classifies geographic areas as labor
surplus areas based on the unemployment rate in that labor market. Contracts
to be performed in labor surplus areas receive a preference when being
evaluated competitively with those to be performed elsewhere. 28
When President Carter announced his urban area assistance program on
March 27, 1978, he stated that, to assure that federal procurement is used to
strengthen the economic base of the nation's cities and communities, he would
direct expansion of the labor surplus area program and direct DOD to target
more of its procurement to high unemployment areas. To date, the Labor
Surplus Area program articulated by Defense Manpower Policy Number 4A
has been of marginal effectiveness, in large measure, because of the Maybank
24 15 U.S.C. 5 637 (1976), as amended by Act ofOct. 24, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-507, § 211, 92 Stat. 1757.
25 13 C.F.R. 5 124.8-1(b) (1978). This limitation of § 8(a) authority was upheld as a reasonable means
of promoting the statutory goal in Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, 477 F.2d 696 (1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 914 (1974).
26 The SBA rules for implementing the changes effected by Pub. L. No. 95-507 were published on May
29, 1979, at 44 Fed. Reg. 30,672 (1979).
27 Preservation of the Mobilization Base Through the Placement of Procurement and Facilities in
Labor Surplus Areas, 32A C.F.R. ch. 1, pt. 134 (DMP-4A) (1979), issued by the Office of Emergency Plan-
ning pursuant to the authority of the Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. 5§ 2061-2166 (1976);
Exec. Order No. 10,480, 18 Fed. Reg. 4939 (1953); and Exec. Order No. 11,051, 27 Fed. Reg. 9683 (1962).
28 Department of Defense policy with regard to Labor Surplus Areas is set forth in DAR § 1-800 (1976).
[December 1979]
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Amendment to the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 195429 which
has been carried over in the Defense Appropriations Act. The current language
reads: "[N]o funds herein appropriated shall be used for the payment of a price
differential on contracts hereafter made for the purpose of relieving economic
dislocation."
30
Notwithstanding DOD's strong support for the Maybank Amendment,
efforts have been made by various members of Congress over the years to
eliminate it. To date, none have been successful.
G. Anti-Inflation
The President's anti-inflation program announced October 24, 1978,31
directed, among other things, that the federal procurement process be con-
ducted so as to recognize anti-inflationary efforts and to channel business to
those firms which limit wage and price increases. By the President's order, the
Council on Wage and Price Stability was directed to enforce his wage-price
guidelines by denying contracts of five million dollars or more to companies
violating the standards. On November 8, 1978, the Federal Register contained
proposed amendments to the Defense Acquisition Regulation which would im-
plement this presidential directive.
32
By these regulations and those promulgated by the Office of Federal Pro-
curement Policy, prospective contractors are required to "voluntarily" certify
compliance with the wage and price standards.
On May 31, 1979, Judge Barrington D. Parker of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia ruled that the President had exceeded his constitu-
tional authority in issuing Executive Order Number 12,092.
33
On June 22, 1979, in a six-to-three decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia overturned the lower court ruling. 34 Writing for
the majority, Chief Judge J. Skelly Wright agreed with the Government's
argument that the President's authority to impose economic sanctions to
achieve compliance with the wage and price guidelines is conferred by the
Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 194935 requiring the
President to promote economy and efficiency in procurement. Section 205(a) of
the Act provides that the President "may prescribe such policies and directives,
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, as he shall deem necessary to
effectuate the provisions of said Act.' '36 While section 3(b) of the Council on
Wage and Price Stability Act 37 prohibits the President from imposing "any
mandatory economic controls," the court found that this did not apply to the
voluntary guidelines of the Executive Order.
29 Pub. L. No. 179, 67 Stat. 336 (1953).
30 Department of Defense Appropriation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-457, S 824, 92 Stat. 1243 (1978).
31 Exec. Order No. 12,092, 3 C.F.R. S 249 (1979).
32 43 Fed. Reg. 52,032 (1978).
33 AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 472 F. Supp. 88 (D.D.C. 1979).
34 AFL-CIO v. Kahn, No. 79-1564 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 14, 1979).
35 40 U.S.C. S5 471-544 (1976).
36 Id. S 486(a).
37 Pub. L. No. 93-387, 5 3(b), 88 Stat. 750 (1974).
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III. Problems
The range of nonprocurement economic and social goals furthered by the
government acquisition process is extensive. An awareness of the potential for
government contracting as a means for promoting social and economic objec-
tives developed during the Depression of the 1930's. The use of this tool has ex-
panded greatly since that time.
The principal problem engendered by the use of the procurement process
in the implementation of national economic and social goals is that the procure-
ment of material becomes more costly and time-consuming with the addition of
each new social and economic program. Legitimate questions may be raised as
to how much of the extra costs and other burdens of these social and economic
programs should be absorbed in the procurement process and how much
should be supported by more explicit means. Indeed, is the use of the procure-
ment process even an efficient vehicle to deliver the benefits sought through the
implementation of the social and economic policies? While the cost of pursuing
nonprocurement objectives through the procurement process cannot be
precisely measured, it is significant.
In addition to costs, the patterns of social and economic objectives im-
plemented through the procurement process disclose various conflicts in
priorities. The need to maintain a domestic production base is in direct conflict
with the need to achieve rationalization, standardization and interoperability
of weapons systems and other equipment within NATO. Buy American and
balance of payments considerations may lead to purchases of goods and ser-
vices at other than the lowest possible price. Debarment of a low bidder
because of noncompliance with anti-inflationary guidelines necessitates pro-
curement from the next highest responsible and responsive bidder. Requiring a
small business to invest its limited resources in the costly exercise of preparing
a bid proposal conflicts with the stated objectives of developing and maintain-
ing economically sound small business firms. Throughout this process an in-
tangible cost is incurred in that citizens, unaware of the social policies being
furthered through the procurement process, lose respect for the process and for
the government as a whole as they observe the government purchasing items at
higher than the lowest possible cost for the purpose of furthering these social
goals.
Recognizing many of these problems, in 1969 Congress created. the Com-
mission on Government Procurement to promote the economy, efficiency and
effectiveness of procurement by the Executive Branch. The Commission
studied the procurement system for two years, and, on December 31, 1972,
presented the results of its study to the Congress. The Commission's four-
volume report contained 149 recommendations for improving government pro-
curement.
The first recommendation of the Commission was that an Office of
Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) be established in the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget for the purpose of rationalizing the government's procure-
ment policies. OFPP is now in the final stages of revising and consolidating the
Federal Procurement Regulation and the Defense Acquisition Regulation into
[December 19791
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the Federal Acquisition Regulation. Although it is likely that this effort will
bring some rationalization to the procurement process, the temptation to con-
tinue to use the vast federal procurement budget to further worthwhile social
goals will continue to win out over any efforts to create a rigid procurement
structure.
